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 This article explores the various presumptions 
and arguments of Canadian courts in largely denying 
queer children a legal presence. An analysis of the 
intersection of homosexuality and children is explored 
with a view to arguing that legally, queer children 
deserve a voice. The author begins by outlining the 
development of the legal conceptualization of the 
“child”. This conceptualization led to the notion of the 
child as innocent, and thus in need of protection. In 
comparison, homosexuals came to be characterized as 
“aberrant” and “predatory”. Protecting children from 
homosexuals then became a simple step of logic, which 
ultimately led to the larger legal construction of the 
“nascently heterosexual” child.  
 This presumption underlies many of the court 
decisions reached in this area, often leading to a 
complete failure on the part of the law to acknowledge 
and confront the complex and sensitive issues facing 
queer children. Heterosexual normalization and 
homosexual “abnormalization” pervades the legal 
landscape, such that any child exhibiting non-
heterosexual tendencies is presumed to have been 
influenced by an “aberrant” and “predatory” 
homosexual adult. Legal institutions respond by 
“protecting” children from homosexual influences, thus 
denying these children access to gay norms and 
contexts. The author canvasses the manner in which 
major institutions and devices—in the context of family 
and custody; religion; education; and harassment and 
verbal abuse—are used to ensure the invisibility of the 
queer child. 
 In conclusion, it is noted that while some courts 
are beginning to recognize the queer child, much 
progress is needed before the queer child is accorded 
full legal visibility.  
 Cet article explore les divers arguments et 
présuppositions proposés par les tribunaux canadiens 
pour refuser dans l’ensemble une présence juridique 
aux enfants homosexuels. L’auteur propose une analyse 
du croisement entre enfance et homosexualité et 
soutient que les enfants homosexuels devraient avoir 
une voix juridique. L’auteur amorce son analyse en 
donnant un aperçu de la conceptualisation juridique de 
la notion d’«enfant». Cette conceptualisation a mené, 
selon lui, à considérer l’enfant comme innocent, et 
partant comme demandant protection. Par 
comparaison, les homosexuels ont été caractérisés 
comme des déviants et des prédateurs. La conclusion 
qu’il fallait protéger les enfants des homosexuels 
devenait donc une évidence, laquelle menait elle-même 
à la construction de la notion juridique de l’enfant 
«hétérosexuel de naissance». 
 Cette présomption est à la base de nombre de 
décisions judiciaires qui, selon l’auteur, ont souvent 
conduit les tribunaux à échouer complètement dans 
leur reconnaissance et leur appréciation des enjeux 
complexes et délicats auxquels est confronté l’enfant 
homosexuel. La normalisation hétérosexuelle et 
l’«anormalisation» homosexuelle se retrouve partout 
dans le paysage juridique de telle sorte qu’il est 
présumé d’emblée qu’un enfant manifestant des 
tendance non hétérosexuelles a subi l’influence d’un 
homosexuel adulte «déviant» et «prédateur». Les 
institutions juridiques répondent en «protégeant» ces 
enfants des influences homosexuelles, les privant ainsi 
d’un accès aux normes et aux contextes gais. L’auteur 
passe en revue la manière dont les institutions et 
instruments importants dans les domaines de la famille 
et de la garde, la religion, l’éducation, de même que le 
harcèlement et l’abus verbal, sont employés pour 
rendre invisible l’enfant homosexuel. 
 En conclusion, l’auteur note que si certains 
tribunaux ont commencé à reconnaître l’enfant 
homosexuel, il reste beaucoup de chemin à parcourir 
avant que celui-ci ne se voit conférer une visibilité 
juridique entière. 
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Introduction 
 This paper examines legal and, in particular, judicial involvement in erasing or 
diminishing the existence of gay, lesbian, and other queer children.1 In a few recent 
but rare cases, Canadian courts have been forced to acknowledge the possibility that 
the gay or lesbian child exists; and even then, the courts have applied standards and 
condoned treatment that simply would not be applied if the issue before the courts 
concerned other (heterosexual) children. Non-heterosexual children are indeed legally 
queer. This paper examines first, in Parts I and II, some of the attributes and 
assumptions that have circumscribed legal considerations of homosexuality and, in 
particular, homosexuality as it intersects with “children”. Finally, in Part III, an 
examination is carried out of specific institutions and contexts that have been 
particularly significant in contributing to the legal disinclination in associating 
homosexuality with children. 
I. The Invisible Queer Child 
 The inadequate legal treatment of children and homosexuality is evidence of a far 
greater social refusal to associate children with homosexuality: an intense and 
pervading message of hetersexual normalization is thoroughly reinforced in young 
people, even within “homosocial contexts” like clubs and sports teams. Children are 
exposed to television shows and movies that almost always portray boys and girls in 
specific roles—roles with expectations of heterosexuality on maturity. Social and 
athletic groups (scouts, sports teams, big sisters, etc.) are organized along gender lines 
with messages of heterosexuality offsetting the homosocial context of the 
organization itself.2 Other instances of heterosexual normalization include events such 
as “Family Day” (i.e., heterosexual “Family Day”), performances by a “king” and 
“queen” in community or school events, and Valentine’s Day ceremonies and 
expectations. Such social events are remarkably symbolic—even intentionally 
symbolic. Their message of heterosexual normalization and homosexual 
“abnormalization” cannot be lost on any person—young or old; these events are 
 
1
 While the intent of this paper is to deal with queer children generally, including gay, lesbian, 
bisexual, transgendered, intersexed, and, perhaps most importantly, “questioning” children, the 
available decisions and existing law deal only with gay and lesbian children—especially the former. 
Gay and lesbian children do have at least some legal visibility, whereas bisexual, transgender, and 
other queer children are likely to be even less legally understood or recognized—though in medical 
and scientific learning they may already have a real presence. Furthermore, adult support movements 
for gays and lesbians have made significant inroads, whereas those for bisexual and transgender 
people have made fewer advances, at least in Canada. See Andrew N. Sharpe, Transgender 
Jurisprudence: Dysphoric Bodies of Law (London: Cavendish, 2002). 
2
 See Pat Griffin, “Homophobia in Sport: Addressing the Needs of Lesbian and Gay High School 
Athletes” in Gerald Unks, ed., The Gay Teen: Educational Practice and Theory for Lesbian, Gay, and 
Bisexual Adolescents (London: Routledge, 1995) 53. 
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powerful devices of social inclusion or exclusion.3 While society may not purport to 
conceive of a child as sexual, it certainly conceives of him or her as nascently 
heterosexual. 
 As in traditional society, with few exceptions, the law, in the form of legislation, 
case law, or administrative practice, has great difficulty conceptualizing a child who 
does not conform to the nascently heterosexual ideal. A child exhibiting homosexual 
sexuality is presumed to be (or to have been) influenced by an adult. The law 
responds to such a presumption by sheltering (“protecting”) the child from 
homosexual people or homosexual influences. Children (including gay children) are 
thus denied ready access to gay norms and contexts: they are “protected”. At the same 
time, however, children are exposed to numerous statements or policies designed to 
convey the message that children who consider themselves homosexual are not 
normal. In Hall (Litigation guardian of) v. Powers,4 a child, who specifically self-
identified as gay, was successful in bringing an action against the principal and the 
school board to allow him to take his same-sex date to the high school prom. While 
the court allowed the application, it nevertheless condoned the general anti-
homosexual sentiment present in the Catholic school, even in the face of the obvious 
presence of at least one gay student in its classroom. Clearly, there was no judicial 
concern for protecting this child’s homosexuality. 
 The law presumes that children cannot be gay, or lesbian, or anything other than 
heterosexual. If children are bullied, or if they commit suicide, the courts and legal 
institutions give excessive weight to even the slightest evidence suggesting that the 
child was not gay.5 It is never assumed that the child might in fact be gay and that he, 
or others like him, might be in need of positive reinforcement with respect to their 
sexuality. One consequence of this failure to recognize potentially gay children is that 
there are, in fact, very few cases in Canada involving the rights of queer children.6 
Those cases that have reached the Supreme Court of Canada, and which are of crucial 
importance for homosexual youth,7 were argued at the “adult level”. That is, the 
primary focus throughout these trials was on adults and adult rights rather than on 
children.  
 
3
 See Bruce MacDougall, Queer Judgments: Homosexuality, Expression, and the Courts in Canada 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2000) at 157 [MacDougall, Queer Judgments]. 
4
 (2002), 59 O.R. (3d) 423, 213 D.L.R. (4th) 308 (Sup. Ct.) [Hall cited to O.R.]. 
5
 See e.g. School District No. 44 (North Vancouver) v. Jubran, [2003] 3 W.W.R. 288, 9 B.C.L.R. 
(4th) 338 (S.C.) [Jubran cited to W.W.R.] (the child was not, in fact, gay despite being tormented by 
other school children for that reason). 
6
 See Jubran, ibid.; MacDougall, Queer Judgments, supra note 3 at 110-11; Andi O’Conor, “Who 
Gets Called Queer in School? Lesbian, Gay, and Bisexual Teenagers, Homophobia, and High School” 
in Unks, supra note 2, 95. 
7
 See especially Chamberlain v. Surrey School District No. 36, [2002] 4 S.C.R. 710, 221 D.L.R. 
(4th) 156 [Chamberlain (S.C.C.) cited to S.C.R.]; Trinity Western University v. British Columbia 
College of Teachers, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 772, 199 D.L.R. (4th) 1 [Trinity Western cited to S.C.R.]. 
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 In Chamberlain v. Surrey School District No. 36, the argument centred around 
children’s access in schools to educational materials on same-sex parents.8 
MacKenzie J.A., after reviewing the authorities on human dignity and Charter 
principles in prohibiting adult discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation, 
stated that “[d]iscrimination against children because of the sexual orientation of their 
parents would be even more invidious.”9 Most invidious, however, and apparently not 
considered as a possibility by the courts, is discrimination against children because of 
their own sexual orientation. It did not cross the many judicial minds of both the 
Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court of Canada that some of the children in the 
school might be gay or lesbian. Similarly, in Trinity Western, where students training 
to be teachers were required to (and did) sign anti-gay pledges, the judges were 
apparently ignorant of the interests of non-heterosexual students—certainly such 
interests were not considered.10 We might speculate whether cases such as 
Chamberlain and Trinity Western would have been treated differently had a gay 
student challenged the impugned actions. As I have said of the Trinity Western case:  
The judges did not ask how a homosexual teacher or student would likely feel 
if they knew that the colleague or teacher had voluntarily signed a document to 
become a teacher saying that their actions, and therefore they, are biblically 
condemned and to be lumped in with cheaters, drunks, thieves and so on.11  
Legal academics and queer activists have also, at times, overlooked the existence and 
interests of queer children.12 The interests of queer children are thus largely ignored. 
 Children often have little or no voice in situations in which they are so directly 
affected; therefore, adults speak for them. Very often, these adults (frequently 
government workers, sometimes child-welfare advocates, and occasionally 
academics) do not understand the complexities inherent in being a gay, lesbian, or 
 
8
 Chamberlain v. Surrey School District No. 36 (2000), 191 D.L.R. (4th) 128, [2000] 10 W.W.R. 
393 [Chamberlain (C.A.) cited to D.L.R.].  
9
 Ibid. at para. 36. 
10
 The notable exception was dissenting Justice L’Heureux-Dubé. See text accompanying notes 
136-37. 
11
 Bruce MacDougall, “A Respectful Distance: Appellate Courts Consider Religious Motivation of 
Public Figures in Homosexual Equality Discourse—the Cases of Chamberlain and Trinity Western 
University” (2002) 35 U.B.C. L. Rev. 511 at 524-25 [MacDougall, “A Respectful Distance”]. 
12
 For example, Kathleen A. Lahey discusses the difficulties of counting how many children are in 
gay and lesbian-parented families, but she does not addess the more difficult question of how to count 
gay and lesbian children (Law and Sexuality in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999) 
at 187-90). In their article on Chamberlain at the superior court level, Shaheen Shariff, Roland Case 
and Michael Manley-Casimir identify three general groups of children whose rights and interests 
were affected by the decision: “Children of parents who personally endorse homosexuality; [c]hildren 
of tolerant heterosexual parents; [and] [c]hildren of non-tolerant heterosexual parents” (“Balancing 
Competing Rights in Education: Surrey School Board’s Book Ban” (2000) 10 Educ. & L.J. 47 at 77). 
Homosexual children themselves are not identified. See also Shaheen Shariff, Roland Case & Linda 
LaRocque, “Begging the Questions: The Court of Appeal Decision in the Surrey School Board Book 
Controversy” (2000) 11 Educ. & L.J. 85. 
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bisexual child; many do not even consider the possibility that a child of such sexual 
orientation could exist. In reference to the context of child protection generally, 
Nicholas Bala has said that “[w]hile child protection workers are typically white, 
well-educated and from middle-class backgrounds, their clients most often are poorly 
educated, living in or near poverty, and not infrequently members of a racial minority 
group and living in a family led by a single parent.”13 To this list, one can add that 
child protection workers themselves are often heterosexual, or they have a 
heterosexual view of children even though the children they confront are, at least 
some of the time, not heterosexual.  
 Even gay or lesbian adults cannot always speak authentically for a gay or lesbian 
child. Circumstances change; and voices in different generations speak differently. 
Some gay and lesbian adults have perhaps forgotten the multitude and complexity of 
issues that arise with respect to being young and queer. Eric Rofes has noted, for 
example, that at least two large barriers prevent professionals and gay activists from 
confronting the phenomenon of the school “sissy”. Rofes writes: 
To say sissies = gay male youth is considered offensive to many in the gay 
community. Instead we insist that gay youth are fully integrated throughout our 
schools: they are on the football team as well as the drama club, student council 
as well as art class, the computer club and the swim team. We tell the world 
that childhood sissies grow up to be men of all sexual orientations. 
 The second reason that little attention has focused on the plight of the sissy 
is that gay male activists and educators alike carry unresolved feelings about 
their own sissy pasts. When we left home and fled to a safer location, we did 
our best to leave our sissy identities behind.14 
Debbie Epstein and Richard Johnson have a somewhat different perspective on this 
generational situation. They write that different generational trends in lesbianism have 
aided in creating a disparity between different generations: 
[P]art of the early 1990s apparent explosion of “lesbian chic” has focussed on 
young, “attractive”, women supposedly less politicized through an engagement 
with feminism than their older (and “unattractive”) “sisters”, confident, visible 
on the scene, and apparently invested chiefly in having a good time. Many 
young lesbians may play with, perform, or invest themselves in, such images, 
without this constituting the whole of their lives; and their experiences at 
school may not bear much similarity to the media images or to their own 
leisure time pursuits.15 
A final obstacle to the creation of an environment where adults can speak confidently 
or strongly for queer youth is the dread experienced by many gay and lesbian adults 
 
13
 Nicholas Bala, “An Introduction to Child Protection Problems” in Nicholas Bala, Joseph P. 
Hornick & Robin Vogl, eds., Canadian Child Welfare Law: Children, Families and the State 
(Toronto: Thomson Educational, 1991) 1 at 15. 
14
 Eric Rofes, “Making Our Schools Safe for Sissies” in Unks, supra note 2, 79 at 81. 
15
 Debbie Epstein & Richard Johnson, Schooling Sexualities (Buckingham: Open University Press, 
1998) at 154. 
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who fear being accused of trying to “convert” young people into homosexuals. 
Below, I will discuss how the idea of the “proselytizing homosexual” has tenaciously 
gripped the social landscape. Simply put, gay and lesbian adults working with 
children, whether as teachers, social workers, or scout leaders, treat the queer child as 
a highly controversial and potentially volatile issue. 
II. Meaning and Content of “Normal” in the Legal Context of a 
Child’s Sexuality/Sexual Orientation 
A. What Is a Child? 
 A preliminary issue, of course, is to determine what we mean by “child”—
whether queer or not. The law is surprisingly black and white, though distinctly 
inconsistent, on this issue. Julia Fionda observes the arbitrary state of the law in the 
British context: 
[L]aws which state that a young person can legally have sex at sixteen, vote at 
eighteen, drink alcohol at home at five but not purchase it until eighteen, marry 
(with parental consent) at sixteen but not have a homosexual relationship until 
eighteen, apply arbitrarily and take little account of the extent to which that 
person is actually “adult” enough to indulge in such activities.16 
 In Canada, the age of majority is nineteen in British Columbia17 and eighteen in 
Alberta.18 According to the Marriage Act of Ontario,19 a person can only marry (with 
parental consent) at the age of sixteen. In Legebokoff v. Legebokoff, however, it was 
held that at common law, the marriage of a child of less than seven years was void.20 
The marriage of a male older than seven years but younger than fourteen years, or a 
female older than seven years but younger than twelve years, was only voidable at the 
instance when the child attained the required minimum age. The age of consent for 
most sexual acts is fourteen,21 but the child pornography provisions of the Criminal 
Code apply if the person depicted looks to be under the age of eighteen.22 
 Part of the problem in legally conceptualizing the “child” is the fairly recent 
development of the child qua child as a special concern of the law. The child has also 
arisen as a new social concern. Fionda notes that the construction of children as a 
social group is a modern phenomenon and that “childhood in this sense was non-
 
16
 Julia Fionda, “Legal Concepts of Childhood: An Introduction” in Julia Fionda, ed., Legal 
Concepts of Childhood (Oxford: Hart, 2001) at 13. 
17
 Age of Majority Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 7, s. 1. 
18
 Age of Majority Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. A-6, s. 1. 
19
 R.S.O. 1990, c. M.3, s. 5(2). 
20
 (1982), 28 R.F.L. (2d) 212 at 215 (B.C. S.C.), relying on Kerr v. Kerr, [1934] S.C.R. 72 at 77, 2 
D.L.R. 369. 
21
 Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 150.1. 
22
 Ibid., s. 163.1. 
1064 MCGILL LAW JOURNAL / REVUE DE DROIT DE MCGILL [Vol. 49 
 
 
existent until at least the seventeenth century in (largely middle class) Europe.”23 To 
the extent that the law was concerned with children, historically, the child was treated 
more or less as the property of the father (in much the same manner in which women 
were treated). In the grammar of the law, the child was accusative, not nominative; 
therefore, a child was not capable of entering into agreements or fully owning 
property independently. Blackstone wrote: 
The legal power of a father (for a mother, as such, is entitled to no power, but 
only to reverence and respect) the power of the father, I say, over the persons of 
his children ceases at the age of twenty one: for they are then enfranchised by 
arriving at years of discretion, or that point which the law has established (as 
some must necessarily be established) when the empire of the father, or other 
guardian, gives place to the empire of reason. Yet, till that age arrives, this 
empire of the father continues even after his death; for he may by his will 
appoint a guardian to his children.24 
 The law also approached women’s sexuality from a male perspective. Similarly, a 
child’s sexuality was approached from a male (adult) perspective. As such, the child, 
as a proprietary object over which adults fought, was not legally conceptualized as 
distinct from a parent or parent substitute. Michael Freeman notes that remnants of the 
ideology of the child as property have remained even beyond the period in which 
modern child law developed.25 Writing in 1975, Mia Kellmer-Pringle was able to 
recognize the attitude that “a baby completes a family, rather like a TV set or fridge ... 
a child belongs to his parents like their other possessions over which they may 
exercise exclusive rights.”26 
 The idea, then, of a child having rights of his or her own—especially as against 
the rights of adults (and most especially as against the rights of his or her parents)—
was not really considered until very recently. Even today, Canadian courts are 
reluctant to detach children’s rights from those of their parents. In B. (R.) v. Children’s 
Aid Society of Metropolitan Toronto, Iacobucci and Major JJ. stated that “a parent’s 
freedom of religion does not include the imposition upon the child of religious 
practices which threaten the safety, health or life of the child.”27 The judges’ apparent 
recognition of the child’s distinct rights is problematic, however, as they seem more 
concerned with the physical integrity of the child than with the child’s mental well-
being. Furthermore, though there was much acclaim for Canada’s accession to the 
 
23
 Fionda, supra note 16 at 3-4. 
24
 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England: A Facsimile of the First Edition of 
1765-1769, vol. 1 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979) c. 16 at 441. 
25
 Michael Freeman, “The Child in Family Law” in Fionda, supra note 16, 183 at 187. 
26
 Mia Kellmer-Pringle, The Needs of Children, 3d ed. (London: Hutchinson, 1975) at 69-70 cited 
in Freeman, “The Child”, ibid. at 187.  
27
 B. (R.) v. Children’s Aid Society of Metropolitan Toronto, [1995] 1 S.C.R. 315 at para. 225, 122 
D.L.R. (4th) 1. 
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Convention on the Rights of the Child,28 it does not appear to have had much impact 
in terms of according children real rights as distinct from (and sometimes opposed to) 
those of their parents.29 
B. Keeping the Child Innocent 
 The present-day legal construction of children, in terms of sexuality, is not 
particularly ancient; though it is, it would seem, deeply entrenched. The legal change 
in attitude toward children first began in the late Victorian era and it continued into 
the twentieth century—an era of reform generally. Interestingly, the twentieth century 
was also the period in which women emerged (legally) as equals to men. However, as 
women began to be accorded full adult rights, children began to be insulated from 
access to rights. In essence, children were pushed further and further away from the 
rights and status associated with adulthood. This theoretical movement encompassed 
the sheltering of children from “adult” experiences. Sheltering now informs the 
modern construction of children as innocent—the very antithesis of homosexuals and 
homosexuality. On this characterization of innocence, Chris Jenks writes that “[s]uch 
a conception has set the public standards for our demeanour towards the child, and for 
our expectations of policy and provision in relation to the child. Such infants are 
essentially pure in heart, angelic and uncorrupted by the world that they have 
entered.”30 Lise Gotell states, “The child as a symbol of innocence, asexuality and 
moral boundaries comes to represent sexual order. The visible sexuality of the child 
symbolizes, in turn, the violation of sexual order.”31 The child has thus emerged, 
primarily, as an asexual legal construction (with heterosexual potential, as will be 
argued below). 
 In fostering the idea of the child as innocent, though nascently heterosexual, 
courts have gone to great lengths to protect children from potential sexual harm. 
Examples of this arise most frequently in cases where any issue surrounding a child’s 
sexual expression exists. Therefore, in R. v. Sharpe,32 even though there was no 
 
28
 20 November 1989, Can. T.S. 1992 No. 3, (entered into force 2 September 1990, accession by 
Canada 12 January 1992). 
29
 See R. Brian Howe & Katherine Covell, “Schools and the Participation Rights of the Child” 
(2000) 10 Educ. & L.J. 107. See generally Shauna Van Praagh, “Faith, Belonging, and the Protection 
of ‘Our’ Children” (1999) 17 Windsor Y.B. Access Just. 154. On children’s rights generally, see the 
articles in the special issue of “Children’s Rights: A Re-appraisal in the light of the United Nations 
Convention on the Rights of the Child” (1992) 6 Int’l J. L. & Fam. 
30
 Chris Jenks, “Sociological Perspectives and Media Representations of Childhood” in Fionda, 
supra note 16, 19 at 26. 
31
 Lise Gotell, “Inverting Image and Reality: R v. Sharpe and the Moral Panic around Child 
Pornography” (2001/2002) 12 Const. Forum Const. 9 at 13. See also Bruce Ryder, “The Harms of 
Child Pornography Law” (2003) 36 U.B.C. L. Rev. 101. 
32
 [2001] 1 S.C.R. 45, 194 D.L.R. (4th) 1 [Sharpe cited to S.C.R.] (upholding the constitutionality 
of Canada’s law banning the possession of child pornography, subject to the reading in of two 
exceptions). 
1066 MCGILL LAW JOURNAL / REVUE DE DROIT DE MCGILL [Vol. 49 
 
 
evidence of actual harm to children, the Court went to great pains to consider the 
potential sexual harm child pornography could cause. The minority judgment in 
Sharpe reveals this type of overt judicial protectionism: 
The derivation of sexual pleasure from the possession of child pornography 
undermines children’s rights and does violence to the values which are 
essential to a free and democratic society. In our view, Parliament had a 
reasonable basis for believing that the prohibition of the possession of child 
pornography would foster and protect children’s Charter rights.33 
 Also, in Sharpe, the Court faced the most difficult of questions in that it was a 
child himself who had generated the “pornographic” material;34 and no other child 
was involved. Both the majority and the minority devoted much attention to 
considering and evaluating these issues. The minority was palpably uncomfortable 
with the association of children and sexual experience. For the minority, L’Heureux-
Dubé, Gonthier, and Bastarache JJ. stated:  
Parliament has recognized that children are the most vulnerable members of 
our society and that they are especially vulnerable to sexual abuse. Any 
provision which protects both children and society by attempting to eradicate 
the sexual exploitation of children clearly has a pressing and substantial 
purpose.35  
As for children’s own writings, the minority thought that that issue was best left to 
lenient sentencing, such that any concern that the law might interfere unduly with the 
freedom of expression of teenagers should be addressed in light of the Young 
Offenders Act.36 “[A]ny teenager convicted for possession of child pornography 
would have the benefit of a more lenient sentence and measures aimed at 
rehabilitation and social reintegration.”37 It is an astonishing situation that children 
would be confronted by the criminal justice system simply for possessing sexually 
explicit depictions of people just like themselves. 
C. The Homosexual as Aberrant and Predatory 
 The late Victorian period and early twentieth century saw the development of the 
foundations of our modern construction of children as distinct from adults (both 
socially and in the law). So, too, did the concepts of “homosexual” and “heterosexual” 
become established. Historically, certain homosexual acts (particularly 
buggery/sodomy) carried criminal consequences; however, neither the law nor society 
had any real conception of a person as either homosexual or heterosexual until the 
 
33
 Ibid. at para. 203. 
34
 See Gotell, supra note 31 at 21; June Ross, “R v. Sharpe and the Defence of Artistic Merit” 
(2001/2002) 12 Const. Forum Const. 23 at 24; Shannon Bell, “Sharpe’s Perverse Aesthetic” 
(2001/2002) 12 Const. Forum Const. 30 at 30. 
35
 Supra note 32 at para. 194. 
36
 R.S.C. 1985, c. Y-1, as rep. by Youth Criminal Justice Act, S.C. 2002, c. 1, s. 199. 
37
 Supra note 32 at para. 231. 
2004] B. MACDOUGALL – THE LEGALLY QUEER CHILD 1067 
 
 
twentieth century.38 Only over time did the law and society begin to characterize certain 
men, and then certain women, as homosexual. However, as I shall argue, such a 
characterization for a child was unimaginable.  
 While it is true today that men and women may be classified as “homosexual” for 
certain legal purposes, the prevalent attitude nevertheless remains that adult 
homosexuality is an aberration—it entails a state of heightened sexualization. Thus, 
homosexuality is directly equated with sexual acts in a way that heterosexuality is 
not.39 Judges have made this assumption even in cases where they have taken a 
“positive” approach to the actual resolution of a legal situation involving 
homosexuality. The judicial presumption that homosexuals are abnormally 
preoccupied with sex is reflected in numerous cases. In Little Sisters Book and Art 
Emporium v. Minister of Justice, the court considered the treatment by Canada 
Customs and Revenue Agency of imported literature with homosexual content.40 
Smith J. stated, without any consciousness of a double standard, that “[s]ince 
homosexuals are defined by their homosexuality and their art and literature is 
permeated with representations of their sexual practices, it is inevitable that they will 
be disproportionately affected by a law proscribing the proliferation of obscene sexual 
representations.”41 Less “sympathetic” courts have had no difficulty jumping to 
conclusions about the sexual propensities of homosexuals. In Vriend v. Alberta,42 
McClung J.A., for the majority at the Court of Appeal, knew nothing about the 
specific sexual practices of Mr. Vriend, who had lost his job because he was gay. 
Nevertheless, he felt comfortable concluding that Mr. Vriend was engaged in 
sodomy—an act he thought the Alberta legislature should not validate.43 Furthermore, 
McClung J.A. clearly associated homosexuality with criminally abnormal sexual 
practices as this is the only possible explanation as to why the judge thought it was 
relevant to the case to mention “the Dahmer, Bernardo and Clifford Robert Olsen 
prosecutions” as recently raising “heightened public concern about violently aberrant 
sexual configurations and how they find expression against their victims.”44 
 Besides the presumption that homosexuals are excessively sexual, a further 
justification for the perception that homosexuals are abnormal appears to be, at least 
 
38
 See Wayne R. Dynes, ed., Encyclopedia of Homosexuality, vol. 1 (New York: Garland, 1990) at 
555-56, s.v. “homosexual (term)”. See generally David F. Greenberg, The Construction of 
Homosexuality (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988). 
39
 See generally MacDougall, Queer Judgments, supra note 3; but see especially MacDougall, 
Queer Judgments, supra note 3, c. 2 at 63 (“Censorship and Censoriousness”). 
40
 Little Sisters Book and Art Emporium v. Canada (Minister of Justice) (1996), 131 D.L.R. (4th), 
18 B.C.L.R. (3d) 241 (Sup. Ct.); aff’d (1998), 160 D.L.R. (4th) 385, 54 B.C.L.R. (3d) 306 (C.A.); 
rev’d [2000] 2 S.C.R. 1120, 193 D.L.R. (4th) 193. 
41
 Ibid. at para. 135. 
42
 (1996), 181 A.R. 16, 132 D.L.R. (4th) 595 (C.A.) [Vriend (C.A.) cited to D.L.R.], rev’d [1998] 1 
S.C.R. 493, 156 D.L.R. (4th) 385. 
43
 Vriend (C.A.), ibid. at para. 32. 
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to some judges, the propensity of homosexuals (both men and women) to force their 
sexual practices on others—including, or perhaps especially, on children. This 
presumption is wholly unfounded since it is almost always heterosexuals who prey 
sexually on children. Lise Gotell writes, in commenting on Sharpe, that “child sexual 
abuse is overwhelmingly a heterosexual crime. This is erased in the dominant 
construction of the pedophilic child pornographer as homosexual. Representations of 
Sharpe have focussed obsessively on his homosexuality.”45 Nevertheless, this view of 
homosexuals as predators of the young finds abundant expression and support in 
judicial decisions. For example, violence in institutions is identified as homosexual. In 
one case involving the sentencing of a young offender46 the court was concerned that 
if the youth was put into an adult facility, there would be a risk that he would be 
forced into homosexual activity. As a psychological report referred to by the court 
noted, “[H]e would easily be the target of regular and frequent, sometimes forced 
homosexual activity that occurs in these [adult] institutions. This includes gang rape 
and a great deal more.”47 The court explained that “[a]ggressive homosexual inmates 
are not automatically placed in segregation.”48 In another young offender case,49 in 
setting out why there were problems in moving the accused to an adult facility, 
Murray J. noted:  
A young offender who is not sufficiently tough will be abused physically, 
sexually and used to carry out the wishes of other inmates, such as being a drug 
courier. If he refuses the protection and homosexual advances from a tougher, 
older inmate, then he will be raped and abused until he accepts that 
protection.50  
Note that the “advances” are not simply sexual; they are homosexual. 
 Other instances where judges make the wrong presumptions about homosexuals 
include cases where an adult sexually assaults a child of the same sex. In such cases, 
some judges appear to think it is logical to turn the case into a paradigm that serves to 
illustrate the nature of homosexuals and homosexuality generally. It is unimaginable 
that a court would follow this kind of reasoning in an equivalent heterosexual 
situation. For example, in R. v. Paquette,51 where a man was convicted of sexual 
assault and gross indecency on a boy, the court considered the threat of the boy 
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 Gotell, supra note 31 at 15. 
46
 R. v. T.D.E. (1991), 116 A.R. 382 (Prov. Ct. (Youth Div.)). 
47
 Ibid. at para. 30.  
48
 Ibid. at para. 40. 
49
 R. v. G.J.M. (1992), 130 A.R. 33 (Q.B.), rev’d (1993), 135 A.R. 204 (C.A.), leave to appeal to 
S.C.C. refused, [1993] 2 S.C.R. vii. 
50
 Ibid. at para. 47. See also Collin v. Kaplan (1982), [1983] 1 F.C. 496, 143 D.L.R. (3d) 121 (T.D.); 
R. v. H (R.A.), [1989] O.J. No. 604 (Youth Ct.) (QL); R. v. S. (W.) (1989), 31 O.A.C. 372, 69 C.R. (3d) 
168; R. v. M.(A.J.) (1986), 46 Alta. L. R. (2d) 306, 29 C.C.C. (3d) 418 (Q.B.); Piche v. Canada 
(Solicitor General), [1984] F.C.J. No. 1008 (T.D.) (QL); R v. E.S., [1991] A.J. No. 873 (Prov. Ct. 
(Youth Div.)) (QL). 
51
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2004] B. MACDOUGALL – THE LEGALLY QUEER CHILD 1069 
 
 
becoming homosexual. In addressing the accused adult, the judge’s underlying belief 
that the boy could be “converted” (obviously from heterosexual to homosexual) was 
central to the analysis. Selbie Co. Ct. J. said: 
 This fatherless boy was vulnerable and you took full advantage of that. You 
deliberately and carefully gained the trust of the boy and his mother with the 
intention of abusing it and if you believe that leading a youth into 
homosexuality is not an abuse, then this Court disagrees with you. ... 
 We have here then the sordid scenario of an aging homosexual on the hunt 
for a young vulnerable youth with little or no concern for the long term effect 
on the youth himself.52 
 The language used by the judge conveys the underlying assumptions of the court: 
the “aging homosexual”, the “fatherless boy”, the “young vulnerable youth”, and “his 
mother” are all part of a “hunt” that is a “sordid scenario”. It is difficult to conceive of 
the use of judicial language such as “an aging heterosexual” or “leading a girl into 
heterosexuality” in circumstances where the victim of a male perpetrator is a girl.  
 Associating homosexuals and homosexuality with a desire to have sex with 
children is sometimes not entirely a consciously made connection on the part of the 
court. Rather, it is more of an automatic association. In a Nova Scotia case, a 
provincial court judge ordered a man to stay away from boys “unless accompanied by 
a heterosexual adult.”53 The underlying assumption was that the company of a 
homosexual adult would not adequately protect boys from being preyed upon. 
Further, when the courts are more accepting of homosexuals and homosexuality in 
deciding cases involving children and homosexuality, concern and fear seem to creep 
into the analysis to the extent that wrong presumptions about homosexuality are 
drawn. Fear of sexual conversion of the child, exposure of the child to promiscuity, 
and the threat of homosexual advances are concerns that simply would not arise in the 
equivalent heterosexual context. In Templeman v. Templeman, for example, there was 
a custody and access dispute between a divorced mother and father over their two 
children.54 The father had realized, during the marriage, that he was gay; 
subsequently, the marriage had broken down. The court acknowledged that 
homosexuality in a parent would not, in and of itself, prevent custody or access for 
that parent. Nevertheless, in granting access to the father, the court added, “In the 
event that the respondent [father] exposes his children to a promiscuous lifestyle or to 
harmful influences, the petitioner of course, has the right to vary these access 
provisions.”55 There was no evidentiary basis of any kind whatsoever to give rise to 
the concern for the father’s tendency towards promiscuity. He was, however, 
homosexual—thus, the judicial concern arose “naturally”.  
 
52
 Ibid. at paras. 5-6.  
53
 See Rick Conrad, “Apology Not Enough, Says Gay Rights Group” [Halifax] Mail-Star (16 
December 1995) A9. 
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 [1986] B.C.J. No. 1426 (S.C.) (QL).  
55
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D. The Nascently Heterosexual Child 
 Inherent in the notion that homosexual adults prey on children and that children 
need to be protected from homosexuality, is, of course, the related idea that 
homosexuality is not natural to, or native in, children. Rather, children are conceived 
of as pure and innocent. This notion of innocence gives meaning to the idea of 
“protection”—without it, “protection” would be meaningless. Note, however, that 
children are not protected from heterosexuality. Thus, while children are not thought 
to be sexual, or to have an “active” sexual orientation, they are nevertheless treated as 
nascently heterosexual. That is, they are thought of as beings who naturally will 
develop into heterosexuals. They may not have a present sexual orientation; however, 
they should be exposed only to heterosexual situations so as to ensure that they reach 
their “heterosexual potential”. The various hetero-erotic messages children receive are 
either not considered “sexual” or not considered relevant. Sometimes, such messages 
are not considered at all. Since homosexuality is, on the one hand, associated with 
sex, and on the other hand, associated with images of deviant sex acts, the inevitable 
conclusion is that homosexuality cannot be associated with children: to allow such an 
association creates the potential for children to be seduced into adopting the 
“homosexual lifestyle”. Also, if children can be taught to be homosexual, then in what 
other “deviant” sexualities might children be implicated?  
 There are numerous examples of this presumption that homosexuality is not 
native to children (and the corresponding idea that children will develop naturally into 
heterosexuals). In Saunders v. Saunders,56 where a father in a homosexual relationship 
wanted access to his child, Wetmore Co. Ct. J. stated, “Surely it cannot be argued the 
exposure of a child to unnatural relations is in the best interests of that child of tender 
years.”57 In another case, where a school principal was convicted of sexually 
assaulting boys, Marshall J., in a lengthy discussion of pedophilia and its effects on 
children, said, “Serious problems of sexual adjustment and sexual orientation in life 
often also follow. All show a sharp loss in self-esteem and confusion in their own 
sexual orientation. Some go on to develop frank homosexuality and paedophilia 
itself.”58 In R. v. Noyes,59 despite witness evidence suggesting it was doubtful that the 
sexual assault of a male child by a male adult “might lead to future paedophilia or 
homosexuality in the victim himself,” Paris J. thought it not “unreasonable ... that a 
process of patterning of the child’s sexual personality may take place, just as such 
patterning takes place in other areas of a child’s personality, attitudes and beliefs 
during the crucially formative years of pre-pubescence and early adolescence.”60 
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While it is true that many children may be ambivalent about their sexual orientation, 
the unspoken assumption in these cases is that children should be steered toward 
heterosexuality. A child naturally developing as a homosexual is believed to have 
been contaminated. Nowhere is the possibility considered by the courts that a child is 
decidedly homosexual. 
 The aversion to associating children with homosexuality is not only prevalent in 
judicial decisions. Some laws, with respect to “homosexual” practices, were grounded 
in a fear of homosexual contagion. Reed J., in Halm v. Canada, said of the section on 
anal intercourse (section 159) of the Criminal Code:61 
 A reading of the debates of the legislative history, including the Wolfenden 
Report, makes it clear that a distinction was made between the age of consent 
under what is now section 159 and the age of consent for other types of 
consensual sexual activity because (1) homosexual practices were considered 
immoral and (2) there was a concern that homosexuality was a learned 
behaviour or a disease such that de-criminalizing the activity in question could 
lead to youth being corrupted.62  
 Thus, the language of disease permeates the law’s treatment of homosexuality and 
children. Implicit in these statements about the abnormality of homosexuality, is the 
assumption that homosexuality is alluring to those with weak minds (including 
children): it is both seductive and unnatural or aberrant. This perceived seductive 
quality leads courts, the legal system, and society to conclude that homosexuality 
infects society—much like a contagious disease. The courts act as the guardians of 
social good in this respect, inhibiting the undue spread of homosexuality. This 
perception of homosexuality as infectious is blatant, for example, in the 1953 case of 
R. v. National News Co. Ltd.63 In this case, a company was charged with possession of 
obscene matter, including the novel, Women’s Barracks,64 which dealt with 
lesbianism. Pickup C.J. noted: 
Counsel contends that the tendency to corrupt and deprave should be related to 
normal persons only. If this means persons who are immune to immoral 
influence from obscenity, the legislation under consideration would not be 
                                                                                                                                        
designate a man faced with charges involving sex with boys as a dangerous sexual offender. The court 
heard evidence on the subject of whether the boys could become homosexual as a result of the 
attacks. Graburn J. summarized the evidence of one of several experts as follows: 
Synthesizing Dr. Cooper’s evidence, he is of the view that out of the large number of 
boys who would be involved, it could be assumed that at least two would be adversely 
affected either by becoming a homosexual or by suffering psychological disturbances 
(at 229). 
In reference to another situation, the judge called becoming homosexual “a potential harm” (at 230). 
See also R. v. W.B.S. (1992), 127 A.R. 65, (sub nom. R. v. P.(M.)), 73 C.C.C. (3d) 530 (C.A.). 
61
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necessary at all. On the other hand, I am not holding that matter is obscene 
which tends to corrupt and deprave only persons who are corrupted and 
depraved. Between these extremes there must be a large section of the public, 
young and old, whose minds are not corrupt and depraved but are open to 
immoral influences.65 
 Legally, homosexuals are conceived of as sexual and predatory by nature; 
however, there is also a legal expectation that homosexuals must alter their sexual 
practices. For example, this expectation of ready change is implicit in both attitudes 
toward children and also toward adults. Such an expectation is reflected in the Roman 
Catholic Church’s condemnation of homosexual “acts”—the hope being that 
homosexuals will change their ways. To the extent that the law does recognize a child, 
or an adult, as gay or lesbian, too frequently there is an expectation that that person 
will control actions flowing from their homosexual “condition”. The pinnacle of this 
judicial and legal attempt at the desexualization of homosexuality is most clearly 
reflected in Re Layland and Minister of Consumer and Commercial Relations, where 
Southey J. noted: 
 The law does not prohibit marriage by homosexuals provided it takes place 
between persons of the opposite sex. Some homosexuals do marry. The fact 
that many homosexuals do not choose to marry, because they do not want 
unions with persons of the opposite sex, is the result of their own preferences, 
not a requirement of the law.66 
 One variation on this judicial attempt at desexualization is where the courts 
analogize same-sex relationships to one of “just friends”. In Egan v. Canada, for 
example, the court compared the living arrangements of a homosexual couple with 
that of a “bachelor and a spinster who live together” as a means of reaching the 
conclusion that neither type of couple “fall[s] within the traditional meaning of the 
conjugal unit or spouses.”67 Likewise, in the same case, La Forest J. noted that gays 
and lesbians are like “all sorts of other couples living together such as brothers and 
sisters or other relatives, regardless of sex, and others who are not related, whatever 
 
65
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reasons these other couples may have for doing so and whatever their sexual 
orientation.”68 
 The judicial expectation of suppression or desexualization is even stronger when 
sexual expression originates in a homosexual child. In Hall, MacKinnon J. rightly 
rejected such a characterization by stating that “[t]hough dancing can be sexually 
expressive, it is not necessarily so. It cannot fairly be equated with having sex.”69 
Nevertheless, the implication of this statement is that homosexual sex could, 
appropriately, be controlled or suppressed by a Catholic school. Similarly, in Trinity 
Western, even homosexual students were expected to abjure from any homosexual 
activity while attending Trinity Western University.70  
 While there are numerous instances where courts seek to protect children from 
adult homosexuality, there is very little evidence of legal effort to protect them from 
adult homophobia. Substantial effort is made, in cases like Sharpe, to consider the 
potential harm to a child that may arise in cases involving anything of a sexual nature. 
Courts have, however, failed to consider that this child might be gay or lesbian—that 
this child may be in need of protection from homophobic situations or statements. In 
situations of homophobic expression, or even homosexual expression, the interests of 
homosexual children are not canvassed. In the cases discussed in the following pages, 
the issue of homosexuality is almost always considered with respect to the adult: 
whether a homosexual adult can get custody; whether books about same-sex parents 
can be in the curriculum; whether a person, who has signed a document stating that 
homosexuality is biblically condemned, is a fit teacher. The potential harm of 
homophobia to a homosexual child is simply not addressed, even where, as in 
Chamberlain (S.C.C.) or Trinity Western, the facts and the legal holding would have a 
direct impact on children. Potential harm to children was the whole point of much of 
the argument in Sharpe, despite no evidence of such harm. In Chamberlain and 
Trinity Western, by contrast, the notion that there may be potential harm to a 
homosexual child—which would almost certainly result if the child were at all aware 
of the circumstances of the case—was not raised for consideration. The reason for this 
lack of consideration is the complete obliteration of the queer child from the 
legal/judicial mind. Only in cases like Hall, where the court was forced to confront 
 
68
 Egan (S.C.C.), ibid. at para 19. This was stated despite strong judicial authority to the contrary. 
As Cory and Iacobucci JJ. said:  
Sexual orientation is more than simply a “status” that an individual possesses. It is 
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the queer child, are the interests of the gay or lesbian child considered. Even then, 
when the courts do address the queer child, they do not fully engage in the issue. 
Instead, they focus on protecting other interested adults and institutions (e.g., the 
Catholic Church), thereby undermining any attention given to the issue of the queer 
child. 
III. State Authorized Devices for Normalizing the Child 
 The remaining part of this paper explores a handful of important devices and 
institutions used by the law, particularly in the context of judicial decisions, to 
perpetuate the invisibility of gay and lesbian youth and ensure the separation of 
children from homosexuality. These devices and institutions are still remarkably well-
entrenched, despite the manner in which the principle of non-discrimination on the 
basis of sexual orientation has taken hold in Canada. The legal devices of 
normalization to be examined include: conceptions of family and custody, religion, 
education, and homophobic and verbal abuse. It should be noted, too, that there are 
other devices. Historically, one of the most important devices was the criminal law. A 
remnant of its “normalizing” attempts can still to be found in section 159 of the 
Criminal Code, which prohibits anal intercourse with those under eighteen years of 
age (except in a husband-wife situation).71 This provision has only been struck down 
in two jurisdictions in Canada. In her reasons for striking down this provision as 
unconstitutional, Abella J.A., for the Ontario Court of Appeal, noted that this section 
has an adverse impact on gay youth given that “[a]nal intercourse is a basic form of 
sexual expression for gay men” and that “[u]nmarried, heterosexual adolescents 14 or 
over can participate in consensual intercourse without criminal penalties; gay 
adolescents cannot.”72 Section 159 is still potentially applicable in other 
jurisdictions—this must surely be seen by gay youth as an indictment of their 
sexuality. 
 The four devices that I have chosen to examine in more detail show both the 
extent of legal attempts at normalization and the extent to which the gay or lesbian 
child is accorded a lesser legal significance than a homosexual adult. In many cases, 
the interests of the queer child are simply overlooked—a result that would be very 
difficult to imagine with respect to an adult’s interests, or even the interests of a 
heterosexual child. The queer adult once had a similar invisibility (except in criminal 
cases), but this has since been partially remedied. One wonders whether the queer 
child will eventually emerge legally, not just as an object of the law, but as a subject 
with independent depth and character. As this section will show, however, the devices 
and institutions used to suppress the homosexual child are very deeply rooted; the 
task is great. 
 
71
 Supra note 21. 
72
 R. v. M. (C.) (1995), 23 O.R. (3d) 629 at 636, 98 C.C.C. (3d) 481 (C.A.). See also R. v. Roy 
(1998), 161 D.L.R. (4th) 148, 125 C.C.C. (3d) 442 (Q.C.A.). 
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A. Conceptions of Family and Custody 
 One device that has been used to normalize the child’s sexuality is legal control of 
the behaviour of the parents. The idea appears to be that maintaining a heterosexual 
environment for children is the best assurance that their nascent heterosexuality will 
develop normally. This issue arises most obviously and frequently in the context of 
custody cases.73 Until very recently, when issues of child custody arose, it was 
automatically thought best for the child to be placed in an environment that would 
foster his (nascent) heterosexuality. Ideally, this meant placing the child in a 
heterosexual environment with no exposure to “deviant” sexualities. Such an 
environment consisted of one (heterosexual) father and one (heterosexual) mother 
living together.74 If the child was unfortunate enough to have a homosexual parent, 
that parent—if allowed to have any contact with the child—would be expected to 
closet his or her homosexuality. While more recent cases do not exhibit the same level 
of overt hostility to the idea of a homosexual parent having custody, there is still 
evidence of unease. At the very least, questions that would not arise in a comparable 
heterosexual situation are asked.75 
 In one custody case, the mother regained custody of her daughter when she 
ceased cohabiting with her female lover. When she later resumed cohabitation with 
that partner, MacKinnon J. said: 
It is, in my view, relevant and significant that the mother would risk losing 
custody of the girls rather than terminate her cohabitation with Mrs. Whittle. 
She knew the basis of the order of Macdonell J. It was she who sought the 
variation on the grounds of terminating the cohabitation. In resuming it, she left 
no doubt as to the priority of her relationship with her companion. It was the 
paramount consideration. She wanted custody. It was, however, not at the 
sacrifice of the homosexual relationship.76 
 As reflected in that case, a court sometimes “bribes” a gay parent by implying that 
if the parent gives up his or her homosexuality, he or she may have a chance in taking 
custody of the child. Where the homosexual parent is not expected to give up 
homosexuality altogether, he or she is, at least, expected to hide it from the children. 
As discussed earlier, homosexuality is not perceived by the courts as an essential part 
of the person, but rather as something of an acquired vice that can easily be secreted 
away from children. Self-censorship appears to be construed as a positive activity for 
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homosexuals. For example, in K v. K,77 an action for divorce and custody of the 
children was brought. The mother in the case was a homosexual. The court awarded 
custody to the mother, but thought it was important that the woman’s relationship “be 
discreet and ... not flaunted to the children or to the community at large.”78 In another 
case, a homosexual father who wanted access to his child, lived with his same-sex 
lover (which is all we are told about the father and his partner).79 The mother, it 
appears, did not outright oppose access, but she was “very concerned that the children 
[two girls] be exposed to a lifestyle that [was] highly confusing, disruptive and 
contrary to their moral upbringing.”80 The mother was particularly concerned about 
overnight access. These concerns were echoed by the court, when McIntyre J. noted 
that he could “readily understand and ... share Mrs. W’s concern about overnight 
access because it could be harmful to the children while [the father’s] present lifestyle 
continues.”81 The resulting court order was that the father was not to be awarded 
overnight visits with his children while engaging in his present  lifestyle.82 The 
underlying judicial message seems to be that the court would rather have a father lie 
about his sexual orientation than be honest. Essentially, the expectation of the court 
was that the father would give up his homosexuality.83 Where parents are not upfront 
about their sexuality, however, a different issue seems to arise. In another case, where 
the mother was “in the closet”, the court stated that “what [was] relevant to the issue 
of care and control [was] the mother’s lying.” Diamond J. went on to say, “I am 
satisfied that dishonesty is an integral part of her life. This mother is a stranger to the 
truth!”84 The homosexual parent can thus be (legally) damned either way—for being 
forthright; or for not revealing his or her true sexual orientation. 
 
In the custody context, another instance of this bias against homosexuality is the 
relative frequency with which one parent will allege the homosexuality of the other, in 
order to reduce the other’s chance of obtaining custody. For example, in J.E.B. v. 
R.G.B., a husband forced his wife to sign a separation agreement by threatening 
that “if she did not sign the agreement, she would never see her kids again. He 
threatened to drag her through the court system, and to expose, publicly, her lesbian 
relationship.”85 Courts have been unusually receptive to investigating the truth of such 
claims even though homosexuality is “not supposed to matter” in custody disputes. 
  
 
77 [1976] 2 W.W.R. 462, (1975) 23 R.F.L. 58 (Alta. Prov. Ct.) [cited to W.W.R.]. 
78 Ibid. at 469. 
79 Worby v. Worby (1985), 43 Sask. R. 135, 48 R.F.L. (2d) 369 (Q.B.) [cited to Sask. R.]. 
80 Ibid. at para. 7. 
81 Ibid. at para. 8. 
82 Ibid. at para. 9. 
83 See also Bernhardt v. Bernhardt (1979), 10 R.F.L. (2d) 32 (Man. Q.B.); D. v. D. (1978), 20 O.R. 
(2d) 722, 88 D.L.R. (3d) 578 (Co. Ct.). 
84 Ewankiw v. Ewankiw (1994), 99 Man. R. (2d) 302 at para. 23 (Q.B. (Fam. Div.)) [Ewankiw]. See 
also S. v. S., [1992] B.C.J. No. 1579 (S.C.) (QL); S v. S, [1996] B.C.J. No. 1923 (S.C.) (QL). 
85 J. E. B. v. R. G. B., [1996] B.C.J. No. 2717 at para. 10 (S.C.), Beames J. (QL). 
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The issue of parental homosexuality and the seriousness with which courts treat it, 
conveys the message to children, aware of the conflict, that homosexuality is 
abnormal, “deviant”, and generally negative. In one custody case, it was alleged that a 
vindictive mother attempted to discredit the father.86 In reference to the mother, 
Hamilton L.J. noted, “The most damaging reference is that by her to her own son, in 
which she described his father as a ‘faggot.’”87 This retort was apparently incited in 
response to a “facetious remark” from the husband.88 Nevertheless, the wife had built 
into her mind “a characterization of her former husband as a homosexual.” Most 
crucially, as the judge noted, she was able to discredit the father in the eyes of his 
son.89 Although custody was awarded to the father, according to the court, the 
mother’s attempt to discredit the father in the eyes of the boy was successful: the child 
came to perceive homosexuality in a negative light.  
 Allegations of homosexuality by one parent against another may also lead to 
judicial scrutiny of the personal life of the “homosexual” parent. In Re O and O,90 a 
mother told her son that it was wrong to sleep in his father’s bed because the son 
would become homosexual.91 The judge rightly found this to be unusual behaviour on 
the part of the mother. However, because the mother raised the possibility of the father 
being homosexual, the court proceeded to examine all of the evidence to determine 
whether there was any truth to the allegations. Such allegations, easily made, can have 
very damaging consequences on family members.92  
 In yet another case, a husband petitioned for a divorce from his wife on the basis 
of mental cruelty.93 Among the many instances alleged by the husband was the one 
that his wife “[had] an obsession about lesbians and in correcting the children, she 
[told] them they don’t want to grow up to be lesbians ... She has carried on a one-
sided hate against the husband’s parents because they ‘drink beer’ and because the 
 
86
 Martini v. Martini, [1987] B.C.J. No. 2757 (S.C.) (QL). 
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 (1980), 30 O.R. (2d) 588, 117 D.L.R. (3d) 159 (H.C.J.) [cited to O.R.]. 
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 Ibid. at 591. 
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 See also Whyte v. Whyte (1991), 101 N.S.R. (2d) 249 (S.C. (T.D.)); Hahn v. Stafford, [1985] O.J. 
No. 595 (H.C.J.) (QL); Guerard v. Parent, [1986] B.C.J. No. 1836 (S.C.) (QL) was a custody case 
where the mother alleged homosexuality on the part of Mr. Guerard, who was not the father, but who 
played a major role in raising the boy. Drost L.J. said: 
During the course of the trial it became apparent that Cynthia Parent was the source of 
several allegations concerning Mr. Guerard, namely: that he is a homosexual and had at 
one time a homosexual relationship with the child’s father, Georges Parent; that he had 
unsavoury and dangerous contacts in the underworld who were a threat to Mrs. 
Parent’s safety; and that he might have sexually abused the child. When Mrs. Parent 
gave evidence concerning these and other matters, I concluded that her testimony was 
untrue. There was no evidence to support her claim that Mr. Guerard is homosexual (at 
para. 27). 
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 Austin v. Austin (1986), 77 N.B.R. (2d) 79 (Q.B. (Fam. Div.)). 
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grandmother is a ‘lesbian.’”94 According to Guerette J, “[t]here [was] not one iota of 
evidence to support these terrible accusations and the husband ... satisfied [the judge] 
that all these manifestations of the wife’s personality arise out of a disoriented and 
distraught mind.”95 Clearly, the wife’s accusation of lesbianism was used to hurt 
somebody. However, did not the judge himself, do the same thing? It was the judge 
who said that calling somebody a lesbian is “terrible”. Also, it was the judge who 
thought it appropriate to look for evidence as to whether the statement was true.96 
 In all of these cases, it is striking that while the homosexuality of one parent may 
not outright preclude that parent from gaining custody, the actions of the accusing 
parent in raising such an issue are not thought of as a relevant factor in determining 
that parent’s fitness to gain custody. That one parent may deliberately instill extremely 
negative views of homosexuality into a child is not thought of as a valid justification 
for precluding custody. The possibility that a potentially gay or lesbian child may be 
forced to live in such a hostile, homophobic environment is not considered either. 
 The general assumption, then, is that it is in the best interests of the child to be 
raised in a heterosexual environment. The sexual orientation of the home environment 
is always perceived of in terms of the sexual orientation of the parents. Courts are 
grossly inept in asking whether, in fact, a homosexual environment would be 
preferable for certain children—the child is always assumed to be heterosexual; and 
the preferable household is always heterosexual. However, based on this rationale, 
might it not be argued that a homosexual household is better for a homosexual 
child?97 Again, because the child is assumed not to have a sexual orientation, and most 
definitely not to be homosexual, the question of the appropriate “sexual environment” 
is not even asked. The queer child simply does not exist. 
B. Religion 
 The law affords religion an enormous role in shaping the mind of a child. It 
accomplishes this in two ways: by giving parents unfettered control over the religious 
views inculcated into a child; and by allowing religion to have a strong influence on 
the education of a child. Furthermore, in both contexts, the forced exposure of 
children to religious messages can be (and very often are) relentlessly homophobic. 
 In the previous section’s discussion, I addressed the “moral” issue raised by some 
parents who allege the homosexuality of the other parent: that is, from a moral 
perspective, should the child not be protected from the homosexuality of a parent? 
The courts condone a characterization of homosexuality in this manner, thus making 
 
94
 Ibid. at para. 15. 
95
 Ibid. 
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 The divorce was granted and custody of the two girls awarded to the father. 
97
 Analogies could be made to other situations of “best interests”, where decisions are made 
ignoring vital factors such as the race of the child. See e.g. Marlee Kline, “Child Welfare Law, ‘Best 
Interests of the Child’ Ideology, and First Nations” (1992) 30 Osgoode Hall L.J. 375. 
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sexual orientation an issue of morality in a way that other prohibited grounds of 
discrimination are not. In fact, the courts rarely take issue with the characterization of 
homosexuality as a moral issue.98 Thus, the identity of homosexual children is 
branded as a “moral” issue—a phenomenon that does not occur with respect to 
heterosexual children. “Moral” arguments about homosexuality are invariably made 
according to the moral precepts of a particular religion. Thus, queer equality rights 
issues, including those of queer children, are often argued in the context of (and 
sometimes judged against) a particular religious morality—a situation that has no 
parallel in Canadian cases dealing with equality rights as they pertain to race, sex, 
ethnicity, and so forth (and even religious equality itself). 
 In the context of parental custody suits, where homosexuality is involved, the 
religious views of one party to the litigation are accorded a great deal of judicial 
respect—even where such religious views diminish the value of the party who is 
homosexual, rendering him or her nothing more than “a homosexual”. In P-B. (D.) v. 
P-B. (T.),99 for example, where a gay father sought access to his children, the mother 
asserted that homosexual behavior was against her religion.100 The judge, quite rightly, 
responded that the mother’s religious beliefs could not be used to bar either the father 
or his same-sex partner from access rights “where those rights [were] in the best 
interests of the children.”101 However, the judge also thought it was relevant that there 
was no evidence of the father “doing anything deliberately for the purpose of 
undermining the children’s religious training.”102 Thus, “doing anything deliberately” 
to undermine the child’s religious training was unacceptable; but it was apparently 
acceptable for straight parents to teach their children hateful ideas about gay parents’ 
“life-styles”. Likewise, it is acceptable for gay parents to be forbidden from 
“undermining” religious teaching. The court did not consider the possibility that the 
children were, themselves, homosexual. Furthermore, would the court be so accepting 
of one parent’s religious views if that parent claimed that he or she considered the 
race, or national origin, of the other parent’s new partner to be immoral according to 
his or her religion? 
 Religion can also be used as a device for instilling ideas of sexual normalcy in 
children. Those with strong religious views are able to use public institutions as a 
means of disseminating their (religious) views and attitudes about homosexuality. The 
most important recent case addressing this issue is Chamberlain (S.C.C.), where 
elected members of a school board denied an application to have books describing 
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children with same-sex parents made available as school resources.103 Specifically, the 
issue arose out of the School Act of British Columbia: 
 76(1)  All schools and Provincial schools must be conducted on strictly 
secular and non-sectarian principles. 
 (2)  The highest morality must be inculcated, but no religious dogma or 
creed is to be taught in a school or Provincial school.104 
 A resolution, referred to as the “Three Books Resolution”, was passed by the 
Board of Trustees of the Surrey School District (“Board”) on 24 April 1997, 
indicating that the Board did not approve of the use of three books, which depicted 
children with same-sex parents, as “Recommended Learning Resources”.105 The issue 
arose against a background of considerable public acrimony in Surrey, as one side 
was driven by religious views. For example, the trial judge noted that there was 
evidence “that at least one trustee who voted for the motion, ... [had] campaigned for 
several years to promote a greater role for religion in governance of the community, 
including on the issue of homosexuality.”106 The court concluded that the Board had 
acted inappropriately; and the majority of the Supreme Court of Canada upheld the 
trial judge’s finding. Of importance to the judges at the various court levels was the 
role of parents in the education process, particularly when those parents have strong 
religious views. McLachlin C.J. acknowledged that parents have an important role to 
play in school administration; however, she cautioned that although parental 
involvement was important, it could not come at the expense of respect for the values 
and practices of all members of the school community. She stated: 
The requirement of secularism in s. 76 of the School Act, the emphasis on 
tolerance in the Preamble, and the insistence of the curriculum on increasing 
awareness of a broad array of family types, all show, in my view, that parental 
concerns must be accommodated in a way that respects diversity. Parental 
views, however important, cannot override the imperative placed upon the 
British Columbia public schools to mirror the diversity of the community and 
teach tolerance and understanding of difference.107 
 Unresolved, however, is the issue of whether legislation could withstand 
constitutional scrutiny if it were drafted so as to allow parents a far greater role in, say, 
the early stages of curriculum development. Or, could the legislature simply defer 
important areas of education and its administration to parents’ groups so as to avoid 
Charter requirements? In Chamberlain, Gonthier J. in his dissent at the Supreme 
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Court level certainly thought it was appropriate for parents to have a determinative 
role in children’s education—even if that meant the imposition of specific views on 
the whole academic system. In stressing the decisive role that parents should play in 
the education of children, he implied that the interests of minorities could be 
overriden where such interests ran contrary to the beliefs of parents. He went on to 
say that in educating children, parents play a primary role while the state plays a 
secondary role.108 Parents, he said, have “the right to bring up and educate [their] 
children in line with [their] conscientious belief[s] ... ”109 
 More obvious instances of religious beliefs dictating heterosexual normalcy can 
be seen in the context of denominational schools, where the underlying denomination 
inculcates views hostile to homosexuality.110 In some jurisdictions, these 
denominational schools are supported by the state. Recently, in Hall, the conflict 
between constitutional guarantees of freedom of religion versus that of non-
discrimination based on sexual orientation have been brought into sharp focus.111 The 
case arose out of the desire of Marc Hall, a student attending a Roman Catholic 
school in Ontario, to take his boyfriend, as his date, to his high school prom. Hall had 
been attending that school, and other publicly-funded Catholic schools, since he first 
started school.112 The principal of the school in question denied Hall permission to 
attend the prom with his boyfriend. His reasoning was that “interaction at a prom 
between romantic partners is a form of sexual activity and that, if permission were 
granted to Mr. Hall to attend the prom with his boyfriend as a same-sex couple, this 
would be seen both as an endorsement and condonation of conduct which is contrary 
to Catholic church teachings.”113 The court noted that the Roman Catholic Church’s 
Catechism “declares that homosexuality is contrary to natural law and can under no 
circumstances be approved.”114 The Catechism states: “homosexual acts are 
intrinsically disordered.”115 The school board refused to reverse the principal’s 
decision. Thereupon, Hall sought an interlocutory injunction restraining the 
defendants from preventing his attendance at the prom with his boyfriend. At the 
eleventh hour, just before the prom was to begin, MacKinnon J. granted Hall the 
injunction.  
 Despite the favourable result of the granting of the injunction, MacKinnon J. 
remarked that “[t]he Board could have counselled Marc on his Church’s teachings 
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about the sinful nature of all premarital sexual activity (heterosexual or homosexual) 
and about the sinful nature of homosexual genital contact.”116 Surely, the judge was 
acutely aware of the despair many homosexual youth face. Nevertheless, the judicial 
sentiment was that Hall’s school could teach him, unconstrained, about the evils of 
acting on his sexual orientation. I have argued elsewhere that in teaching courses such 
as literature, biology, physical education, and in student activities where the core 
subject matter is not religious, a (religious) school is exercising a governmental 
function, and thus, the Charter should be applicable.117 A comparison should be drawn 
between the Hall situation and one where the issue was not sexual orientation, but 
sex, race, or ethnic background. A particular religion could quite conceivably teach 
that women are inferior or that black people should be kept separate from others. But 
what if followers of that religion wished to operate a state-accredited educational 
institution? It may be true that such followers simply would not receive state 
support.118 However, more to the point is the fact that a court would surely be 
concerned, at least in part, with the invidious position in which a female or black 
student might be put if such views were taught as an ordinary part of the curriculum. 
In Hall, however, even though it was clear that Hall was gay, the court was not 
compelled to address the potential negative consequences of a school teaching anti-
homosexual sentiment where homosexual students were clearly present. Thus, 
religion and religious teachings are often used as a sound justification for ignoring 
homosexual children. 
C. Education 
 Aside from the specific issue of religious beliefs influencing thoughts on 
homosexuality in education, the education system is notorious for its 
heterocentricity.119 It is difficult to argue with the proposition that over the years, the 
education system (along with the mass media) has become ever more important in 
shaping the views of youth. At the same time, students in schools have little voice in 
how education is provided to them.120 Education and its institutions are permeated 
with adult voices and adult perspectives.  
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 The education system has not always been successful at creating a comfortable 
“space” for young people who are, or think they are, queer.121 Education systems have 
put up barriers to queer content in schools, and such barriers maintain an atmosphere 
of hostility, or at best, indifference to the “other-than-heterosexual”.122 In recent cases 
addressing homosexual issues in the education context, there has been little progress. 
In fact, one may well wonder how a gay or lesbian student might respond to the 
mostly negative messages conveyed by judges as to the relative value of being gay as 
compared to heterosexual. 
 Until Chamberlain (S.C.C.), very little case law directly addressed the issue of 
whether it was appropriate to exclude (positive) material about homosexuality from 
school curricula. Mostly, the decision to include such material into the curriculum was 
left to parents’ groups, and even now, after Chamberlain (S.C.C.), parents’ groups 
play a large role.123 In one instance in the late 1980s, a parents’ group in Prince 
George succeeded in ensuring that a book, called Boys and Sex, was banned from the 
senior secondary school library in part because it “was inappropriate” in discussing 
homosexuality, among other things.124 The parents feared that the book would 
“undermine children’s faith in both their parents and in religion.”125  
 In Chamberlain (S.C.C.), where the books were far more mainstream than in the 
Prince George case, the ultimate result was more inclusive of homosexuality. As 
mentioned above, however, the Supreme Court’s decision to include the materials was 
based on the wording of the School Act of British Columbia126 and not on any general 
constitutional principle that could stand to protect gays and lesbians in other 
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legislative circumstances. Furthermore, as noted, the judges failed to show any 
concern for, or even awareness of, gay and lesbian or other queer youth in the 
schools. Rather, the discussion focused on adults: the books in question addressed 
homosexual adults; and the rights adjudicated upon were adults’ rights. Further, adults 
brought the legal challenge to the Board’s actions.  
 Importantly though, even those adults who brought the challenge forward were 
not treated receptively by the court. At the Court of Appeal, the motives of those who 
sought to include gay and lesbian material in the curriculum were cast in a dubious 
light. The court rendered a thinly-veiled critique of these homosexual rights advocates 
for choosing the particular situation in question to raise rights issues. Specifically, 
Mackenzie J.A. questioned the motives of those who argued for the inclusion of the 
three books as classroom resources. He simply could not accept that the initiative of 
the petitioners was “aimed only at demonstrating the presence of nurturing values in 
alternative families generally.”127 Instead, he believed that “[t]he three books in issue 
were selected for their sexual orientation dimension”; and further, that the children 
were simply a means of causing the books to “come to the attention of parents who 
would object to the sexual orientation dimension as morally offensive.”128 
 As I have said elsewhere in the context of this case: 
As a result, even today, the public school curriculum is riddled with hetero-
erotic messages for children, a situation that is simply taken for granted. 
Furthermore, while the discourse of rights advocates is apparent (and 
“controversial”), the discourse of those who advocate tradition is often in a 
code that is so familiar that those (like the judge) do not take notice of it, 
though its meaning is clearly exclusionary of homosexuals. So, the vocabulary 
of morality, children, parental authority, community, values, discipline and 
even education is usually intended, albeit sometimes unconsciously, to convey 
a particular heterosexual meaning and context.129 
 Within the education context, the invisibility of queer children and their concerns 
is even more apparent in Trinity Western—a case involving a university that “served 
the needs of the whole Christian community.”130 In this case, the British Columbia 
College of Teachers (“B.C.C.T.”) refused to accredit the teacher education program of 
the university because, in the opinion of the B.C.C.T., the proposed program was 
discriminatory and contrary to public policy as graduates were likely to be biased 
when dealing with homosexual students.131 The B.C.C.T. argued that students at the 
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university, including those wanting to be teachers, were required to (and did) 
subscribe, on admission, to a code of conduct (a “Community Standards” document). 
Part of the agreement included the obligation to refrain from homosexual behaviour. 
This requirement was found in a paragraph that read:  
REFRAIN FROM PRACTICES THAT ARE BIBLICALLY CONDEMNED. 
These include but are not limited to drunkenness, ... all forms of dishonesty 
including cheating and stealing, ... involvement in the occult ... and sexual sins 
including viewing of pornography, premarital sex, adultery, and homosexual 
behaviour ... [biblical references omitted].132 Faculty and staff were required to 
sign a similar document. The BCCT refused to accredit graduates from Trinity 
Western University unless they had taken another year of studies at Simon 
Fraser University. 
 The decision of the B.C.C.T. was upheld on appeal to the college’s council, but 
was overturned by the British Columbia Supreme Court. At the British Columbia 
Court of Appeal, the trial judge’s decision was affirmed on the basis that there was no 
reasonable foundation for the B.C.C.T.’s finding of discrimination.133 The majority of 
the Supreme Court of Canada upheld that decision on appeal, with L’Heureux-Dubé 
J. being the sole dissenter. What is perhaps most striking from these decisions of the 
various levels of court is that, with the exception of L’Heureux-Dubé J., the concerns 
and perspectives of gay and lesbian youth were not canvassed. Adult perspectives and 
attitudes of adults, including homosexual adults, were addressed; but the queer youth 
perspective was invisible. 
 The majority decision in Trinity Western protected religious freedom, even where 
that meant pardoning the discriminatory acts of particular religious individuals 
entering the public arena as teachers. The majority accomplished this by taking an 
                                                                                                                                        
certificates of qualification and applicants for membership and, ... to encourage the 
professional interest of its members ... ” (R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 449).  
This was the reference to the public interest that the B.C.C.T. invoked as justification for considering 
the Trinity Western admissions policy in deciding on the certification of its teacher education 
programme: “The BCCT argue[d] that teaching programs must be offered in an environment that 
reflects human rights values and that those values can be used as a guide in the assessment of the 
impact of discriminatory practices on pedagogy” (Trinity Western, supra note 7 at para. 11). The 
B.C.C.T. required graduates of Trinity Western to do a year of study at Simon Fraser University in 
order to consider them for qualification as teachers. 
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extremely narrow view of what constitutes an individual “acting on belief”. Iacobucci 
and Bastarache JJ. said:  
[T]he proper place to draw the line in cases like the one at bar is generally 
between belief and conduct. The freedom to hold beliefs is broader than the 
freedom to act on them. Absent concrete evidence that training teachers at 
TWU [Trinity Western University] fosters discrimination in the public schools 
of B.C., the freedom of individuals to adhere to certain religious beliefs while 
at TWU should be respected.134  
The majority did not accept that the actual act of signing the document was a 
homophobic act. Instead, the Court stated, “While homosexuals may be discouraged 
from attending TWU, a private institution based on particular religious beliefs, they 
will not be prevented from becoming teachers. In addition, there is nothing in the 
TWU Community Standards that indicates that graduates of TWU will not treat 
homosexuals fairly and respectfully.”135 
 The majority judges did not ask how homosexual teachers or students would feel 
if they knew that a colleague had voluntarily signed a document attesting to the fact 
that their actions, and therefore they, are to be biblically condemned. Anybody signing 
such a document was, in effect, agreeing that homosexuals ought to be equated with 
cheaters, drunks, and thieves. This concern was raised by L’Heureux-Dubé J. in 
dissent. She said, in a rare example of judicial awareness of gay and lesbian youth: 
 Evidence shows that there is an acute need for improvement in the 
experiences of homosexual and bisexual students in Canadian classrooms. ... 
 The B.C. report also showed that 37 percent of the gay and lesbian youth 
questioned feel like outsiders at school. None of the youth gave high ratings to 
the quality of his or her family relationships. Almost 40 percent have 
dramatically low self-esteem. Two-thirds often hear homophobic remarks made 
by other students at school. Nearly one in five had been physically assaulted at 
school in the past year.136 
L’Heureux-Dubé J. at least attempted to view the situation from the perspective of a 
queer student: 
 Without the existence of supportive classroom environments, homosexual 
and bisexual students will be forced to remain invisible and reluctant to 
approach their teachers. They will be victims of identity erasure, forced to 
endure what Professor Kathleen Lahey has called “a ‘spiral of silence’ in which 
lesbians and gays modify their behaviour to avoid the impact of prejudice”.137 
 Such views are, however, distinctly unusual from the bench. Much more common 
is the attitude that disputes about homosexuality in schools are disputes among adults 
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about adult issues. A further example of this appears in the case of a Manitoba teacher 
who wished to, but was denied, permission to reveal her sexual orientation to her 
students in grades seven and eight.138 She had apparently observed prejudice against 
and intolerance of homosexuals in the clasroom. She therefore thought her disclosure 
might force students “to confront the truth that homosexuals were not individuals 
deserving of discrimination.”139 The denial of permission was justified by the assistant 
superintendant on the basis it was thought “inappropriate for a teacher, in the course 
of the objective presentation of any instructional material, to declare their own sexual 
orientation, be they heterosexual or homosexual.”140 This case is interesting because it 
reveals how a school board was uncomfortable with allowing children to confront 
homosexuality; but also how the school board was blind to the fact that heterosexual 
teachers reveal their heterosexuality to students all the time. These disclosures are 
never considered problematic. At the Court of Appeal, Twaddle J.A. stated:  
[I]t might be reasonable to prohibit a teacher from discussing intimate details of 
his or her sex life—or even from disclosing the teacher’s sexual orientation—
as a means of encouraging students to choose the teacher’s lifestyle, but 
unreasonable to prohibit a teacher from using the fact of his or her 
homosexuality as a means of combatting intolerance of homosexuals.141  
Inherent in this view is the idea that adult homosexuality is contagious to children and 
that homosexuality is something students may study as an outside phenomenon. That 
children might see themselves, personally, as homosexual is largely inconceivable. 
Legally, the child is almost always an outsider on matters of sexual orientation. 
D. Harassment and Verbal Abuse 
 A fourth device to consider in the context of normalization is harassment and 
verbal abuse. This device is, undoubtedly, the most direct form of marginalization that 
a queer child will experience. Undoubtedly, it is the biggest factor in conditioning 
people generally, from an early age, to associate non-heterosexuality with negativity. 
Hostility and abuse is taught to be an appropriate and justifiable response. This device 
can be termed an institution because harassment and abuse has become an almost 
accepted part of our society, even within the running of public institutions. Agencies 
of law and justice do little to attack really the prevalence of harassment and abuse. 
 Children are taught from a young age to associate homosexuality with negativity 
and denigration. Attempts to humiliate a person by calling him “homosexual” begin 
early in life. R. v. Homma illustrates the fear many children experience of homosexual 
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identification in schools.142 In that case, two boys, who were being sexually abused by 
their male teacher, did not report the incidents. As Taggart J.A. noted, “The two boys 
did not make complaints of the conduct of the appellant because they were 
embarrassed. They intimated that they might be considered by their peers to be 
homosexuals.”143 This fear by children of being ridiculed as homosexual is a response 
that children have learned from adults. Often, it is taught in the family context, and 
particularly in the context of marital breakdown and custody disputes. Some of these 
situations are bizarre. In one case, a mother and father were in a dispute over the 
father’s access to the children.144 The father was both abusive and alcoholic and had 
previously sexually assaulted a teenage boy. During one of the father’s last overnight 
access weekends, he made allegations that the mother’s boyfriend had molested their 
sons.145 When the mother came to collect her children, “in front of her sons and the 
accompanying police, [the father said] ‘Go play with your homosexual boyfriend.’”146 
The father did not perceive himself as homosexual. He had little to be proud of; but he 
still felt he could “elevate” himself above the mother’s “boyfriend” by belittling him 
as “homosexual”.147 
 Adults can use abusive terms for homosexuals around children in a deliberate 
attempt to hurt children. Adults play on the humiliation they know the child has been 
taught to feel and associate with homosexuality. In R. v. Hawkins, the accused was 
convicted of the sexual assault of a fourteen-year-old girl.148 Part of the assault 
involved a lesbian fantasy of the accused. As part of the girl’s harrowing experience, 
the accused asked the girl whether her friends were lesbians. When she responded in 
the negative, the accused appeared to get angry.149 In this case, the adult, and the 
violence he committed, conveyed the message that the lesbian is both a fantasy object 
for men and a term of abuse. In another case, the boyfriend of a mother “was verbally 
abusive, calling the girls sluts, tramps and lazy and calling the boys lazy and queer.”150 
In exposing children to this type of homophobia, heterosexual normalization is 
strengthened. The bullying of queer children at school is probably the first encounter 
many children experience with respect to their sexual feelings and society. Eric Rofes 
has written: 
 As I got older, and fully entered the society of children, I met the key 
enforcer of social roles among children: the bully. The bully was the boy who 
defined me as queer to my peers. If they had not already noticed, he pointed 
 
142
 [1989] B.C.J. No. 793 (C.A.) (QL). 
143
 Ibid. at para. 10. 
144
 R.R.T. v. G.T., [1994] O.J. No. 2453 (Prov. Div.) (QL). See also Children’s Aid Society of the 
Regional Municipality of Waterloo v. R. (T.), [1990] O.J. No. 766 (Prov. Ct. (Fam. Div.)) (QL). 
145
 Ibid. at para. 18. 
146
 Ibid. at para. 21. 
147
 See MacDougall, Queer Judgments, supra note 3 at 141. 
148
 R. v. Hawkins, [1986] B.C.J. No. 1115 (C.A.) (QL). 
149
 Ibid. at para. 5, Esson J.A. 
150
 R. v. N.(R.K.) (1997), 32 O.R. (3d) 537 at 540 (C.A.). 
2004] B. MACDOUGALL – THE LEGALLY QUEER CHILD 1089 
 
 
out my non-conformity. He was ever-present throughout my childhood, like an 
evil spirit entering bodies on different occasions. He haunted me at school, 
throughout my neighborhood, during synagogue, even at birthday parties. In 
any group of three or more boys, the bully was present.151 
 Jubran v. Board of Trustees provides a stark reminder of the pervasiveness of 
harassment and abuse in public institutions. At first instance, the British Columbia 
Human Rights Tribunal awarded damages to a high school student who did not 
identify as gay despite homophobic epithets by other students.152 The Supreme Court 
of British Columbia agreed that “the heart of the attack on Jubran drew on terms that 
come quickly to the lips of homophobes.”153 It was found that Jubran was not a 
homosexual and that the students who attacked him did not believe him to be a 
homosexual. The court therefore found that Jubran could not been discriminated 
against—simply, he was not gay. In spite of this result, the case demonstrates 
complete judicial ignorance of the hostility many gay and lesbian children do face. 
Would a child who actually is gay, self-identify as such before a tribunal or court that 
is blind to homosexual issues? Is not the creation of a homophobic environment, 
whereby any child (whether gay or lesbian) might suffer from oppression, enough to 
motivate a court to act? William Black has said: 
 The fact that Mr. Jubran was a teenager makes it more likely that he would 
internalize some of the sting of the homophobic taunts even if he identified 
himself as heterosexual. Teenage years are a time of coming to terms with 
one’s sexuality. Doubts and anxieties are not at all uncommon. Even a teenager 
who clearly identifies himself or herself as heterosexual may have sometimes 
had feelings inconsistent with that identity and may thus be susceptible to 
accusations of being gay or lesbian.154 
 The court’s tolerance in Jubran of an anti-gay environment was similarly present 
in the case of Culhane v. Rawlings.155 In this case, a plaintiff alleged that the defendant 
had defamed him at work by calling him “a son of a bitch and a male person who 
performed homosexual acts.”156 In response, McCart C.J. said: 
If this was all that the defendant said to the plaintiff, I would have no hesitation 
in acceding to the defendant’s request that I strike out the statement of claim as 
disclosing no reasonable cause of action. If I had one dollar for everytime I 
heard either of those expressions during some three years in the armed forces 
and at summer jobs while attending university and law school, I would have 
been financially independent by the time I was 25 years old. Their use is so 
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commonplace as to be virtually incapable of constituting defamation. In some 
perverse way they seem to be used as expressions of friendship.157 
 Furthermore, the above-mentioned examples have been limited to verbal abuse in 
the context of children. Aggressive and very public homophobic pronouncements by 
various religious and political leaders must surely have a deeper impact on children at 
a broader level. What of children who know, as might be the case in the Trinity 
Western situation, that their very own teachers have signed declarations that are hostile 
to homosexuals? When queer children see their heterosexual classmates exploring their 
sexuality with the support of their schools, parents, and churches, how are they to feel 
when they are told, at best, that they will be treated with sympathy, but that under no 
circumstances should they explore their tendencies toward homosexuality? As 
L’Heureux-Dubé J. stated in Trinity Western, the status/conduct or identity/practice 
distinction for homosexuals and bisexuals should be soundly rejected: 
I am dismayed that at various points in the history of this case the argument has 
been made that one can separate condemnation of the “sexual sin” of 
“homosexual behaviour” from intolerance of those with homosexual or 
bisexual orientations. This position alleges that one can love the sinner, but 
condemn the sin. But, in the words of the intervener EGALE, “[r]equiring 
someone not to act in accordance with their identity is harmful and cruel. It 
destroys the human spirit. Pressure to change their behaviour and deny their 
sexual identity has proved tremendously damaging to young persons seeking to 
come to terms with their sexual orientation” (factum, at para. 34).158 
Conclusion 
 Growing up as a queer child can be difficult. One writer has said, “The world of 
children was a cruel place for me.”159 It is true that children, including queer children, 
are bound to be raised in a predominantly heterosexual environment. It is also true 
that “it is a fundamental premise of our society that coercive government interference 
in family life should be kept to a minimum.”160 However, at times, courts do get 
actively involved in family situations involving children. Is it too much to expect 
courts to be aware of the distinct possibility that the children in these cases are not 
(always) heterosexual? As William Black said in the context of Jubran case:  
 In a school of over 1,300 students, it seems clear that there must have been 
a significant number of other students who either identified themselves as gay 
or lesbian, at least internally, or who had doubts about their sexuality. There 
was evidence in the Jubran case concerning a survey of male students showing 
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that seven percent of male students and eight percent of female students did not 
think of themselves as heterosexual. [footnote omitted]161 
 Some courts are beginning to see the queer child. This recognition includes an 
awareness of some of the damaging consequences that can result from ostracizing 
queer children. In Hall, Mackinnon J. noted: “I have already observed that the effects 
of this sort of exclusion are pervasive, serious and contribute to an atmosphere of self 
destructive behaviour among gay youth.”162 And, in Trinity Western, L’Heureux-Dubé 
J. remarked: “The study found that 46 percent of the gay and lesbian youth had 
attempted suicide at least once. Their average age at the first suicide attempt was 13 
years.”163 While such recognition is important, it is also important for courts to realize 
that most gay and lesbian students are not suicidal but still need judicial recognition 
and support. A judicial recognition of the devices and institutions that have been used 
to perpetuate queer child invisibility would aid in creating a more normal 
environment for these young people, whose rights should not be dependent or 
constrained by the prejudices and preconceptions of the adults in their world. 
 Important, too, is to find a way for children themselves to be comfortable 
bringing these issues of sexual orientation in front of legal institutions. This process 
may involve a reassessment of the way in which such institutions operate, as has 
become established in other legal contexts involving children.164 And, most especially, 
courts have to accept that queer children may not speak directly about issues relating 
to their sexuality in the same open and certain manner that an adult might discuss 
such issues. Courts have to improve at anticipating issues that affect queer children; 
this includes being sensitive to potential harm, as judges in child pornography cases 
exhibit toward children generally. The courts should not make the assumption that 
homosexuality, or other queer sexuality, is not an issue merely because the person, 
either in front of the court, or implicated in the case, has not reached the age of 
majority or consent. In the parlours of the law, queer children should be both seen and 
heard. 
    
 
161
 Black, supra note 154 at 54. 
162
 Hall, supra note 4 at para. 56. 
163
 Trinity Western, supra note 7 at para. 69. 
164
 This is particularly true in the criminal procedure context. See Wendy van Tongeren Harvey & 
Paulah Edwards Dauns, Sexual Offences Against Children and the Criminal Process, 2d ed. (Toronto: 
Butterworths, 2001). 
